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"THERE'LL ALWAYS BE AN ENGLAND": 
THE INSTRUMENTAL IDEOLOGY 
OF EVIDENCE 
Kenneth W. Graham, Jr.* 
THEORIES OF EVIDENCE: BENTHAM AND WIGMORE. By William 
Twining. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1985. Pp. x, 265. 
$29.50. 
On April 26, 1783, as the defeated imperial army was preparing to 
return to England, a flotilla carrying 7000 "boat people" sailed out of 
New York harbor. These Loyalist refugees were the last contingent of 
an exodus of more than 100,000 who fled to Canada or Europe to 
escape the consequences of a protracted guerrilla war waged by 
George Washington's Continental regulars and allied bands of terror-
ist irregulars who lacked the common decency to be slaughtered in the 
traditional European fashion. The emigres included many, perhaps 
most, of the colonial lawyers, and Isaac Royall, a wealthy slave driver 
who was later to revenge himself upon his persecutors by funding one 
of the major counterrevolutionary institutions in the States. 
Some colonial lawyers cast their lot with the revolutionaries, hop-
ing that independence would mean replacement rather than displace-
ment of the aristocratic forces that had governed most of the colonies. 
These anglophile lawyers found allies on both sides of the Atlantic 
among those who hoped that, despite its military and political defeat, 
the Evil Empire might maintain economic and cultural tutelage over 
its former colonies. These quisling lawyers flocked to the Federalist 
party; after its defeat some of them went over to the loyal opposition, 
others were pensioned off to the federal bench to continue the war 
against the democratic tendencies of the infant republic, while still 
others retreated to the bank of the River Charles where Royall's patri-
mony enabled them to found the last headquarters of the Federalist 
* "Kenneth W. Graham, Jr." is the pseudonym of a semi-retired sex maniac of mixed but 
predominantly Celto-Slavic ancestry who is employed as a teacher of evidence at a poor but 
pretentious public university somewhere on the West Coast. (The last five words are in the 
interest of accuracy, not anonymity; if what the geologists tell us is true, the locus in quo is 
moving at a pace that will, if it has not fallen into the Pacific Ocean long before, put it anywhere 
from Portland to Port Barrow by the time this piece is published.) 
Inasmuch as all the crazy stuff is in the text, there seems to be little reason to sacrifiee a tree 
to fend off with footnotes the suspicions of those who do not trust the editors to insure that the 
author has actually said something like that of which he stands accused by the reviewer. Those 
with a "need to know" can obtain the sources of other information alluded to in the text from the 
reviewer. 
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party and one of the most redoubtable outposts of English imperial-
ism. "The rest," as they say, "is history." 
The imperial ambitions and political strategies of the Harvard Law 
School eventually proved to be almost as vast and successful as those 
of its English idols. For more than a century, the landscape of Ameri-
can legal education has been dominated by the original and a number 
of "petty Harvards" founded by missionaries sent out from Cambridge 
to spread the Word to the unbaptized heathen of the South and West. 
Nowhere have these sneering pseudo-Englishmen been more success-
ful in prescribing the orthodox than in the field of adjective law. To 
this day, procedural scholarship has been dominated by an ideology, 
posing as "science," whose devotees maintain the conceit that, despite 
the declarations of July, 1776, there continues to exist something that 
they like to call "the Anglo-American legal system." 
Recently, however, there have been stirrings of revolt. Like so 
much that has gone wrong for them, the imperialists can justifiably 
blame this incipient insurrection on the Beatles. Except for their "cute 
accent," most of what was appealing about the "Fab Four" was in-
spired by (if not stolen from) Black American music. The rediscovery 
of the revolutionary possibilities of the American cultural heritage by 
the lads from Liverpool was a source of both inspiration and anger, 
qualities not entirely consonant with brahmanism. This foreign ap-
propriation of our musical culture, and the recent infatuation of busi-
ness bosses with a currently more successful Empire of Imitation, 
served to remind American scholars that most of the institutions sup-
posed to be typically English were about as indigenous as Japanese 
baseball. Moreover, if the pictures of contemporary England 
presented by other English rockers, such as the Sex Pistols, were to be 
believed (and they were), then not only were these institutions not very 
English, they were also not particularly admirable. 
The social movements for which the Beatles provided the early an-
thems also led the junior half of the Anglo-American dyad to a change 
in self-perception. Inspired by the example of those ethnic groups that 
did not have a colo(u)rable claim to be "Anglo-Saxon," other hyphen-
ated Americans began to explore their own "Roots;'' These groups of 
traditionally despised ethnics soon discovered that their remote ances-
tors had had civilizations at a time when the denizens of the British 
Isles were still enthusiastically eating one another. The more studious 
learned how their ancestors' contributions to American culture had 
been belittled or appropriated by effete Eastern anglophiles, how their 
parents had fought valiantly against the often brutal oppression of 
Briticized bullies of the likes of Theodore Roosevelt and A. Mitchell 
Palmer, and how the long-standing and insidious exaggeration in our 
leading educational institutions of the virtues of English culture had 
served to defuse, if not defeat, the democratizing tendencies of the 
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frontier. The upshot of this new enthusiasm for their own heritage 
was that many third and fourth generation ethnics no longer felt they 
had to affect English manners and values to assimilate; to be "ethnic" 
was to be "American." 
It took somewhat longer for these cultural currents to seep 
through the foundations of those shrines of Anglo-worship, the Amer-
ican law schools. Indeed, one imagines that even today yuppies in 
Cambridge are flocking to English pubs long after diners elsewhere 
have discovered that English culinary art runs more to the rigors of 
cannibalism than to the extravagance of haute cuisine. Be that as it 
may (and it might), recent events in Ireland and Argentina have re-
vealed how the storied "stiff upper lip" conceals a set of fangs as sharp 
as those possessed by despots in less-fashionable corners of the globe. 
Belfast and Brighton gave lie to the claim that the tolerant English 
would have done better than we did at our Birmingham. Royal wed-
dings may make the English feel better about themselves, but they do 
little to erase the images elsewhere of those "sporting chaps" bashing 
soccer opponents with lead pipes. Even first-year law students can see 
the folly in taking as a model a nation that has junked the jury and 
maintained the monarchy. Nowadays when a law professor reaches 
for his hankie at the words "our Anglo-American heritage" one can-
not be sure whether he wishes to wipe away a tear or stifle a giggle. 
The point of this Anglo-bashing is not that the English are any 
worse than any other ethnic group; merely that they are no better. 
The same cannot be said of American Anglophiles. There is a cultural 
distance between academicians who aspire to Englishry and the crack-
pot followers of Anglo-lsraelism, a murderous anti-semitic religion 
whose tenets include the belief that the English and not the Jews were 
the Chosen People of God; but ideologically the snobs and the assas-
sins are not that far apart. It would be difficult to exaggerate the 
number of mistakes, even atrocities, that have been committed under 
the flag of Anglo-Saxon moral or intellectual superiority. 
More to the point are the probable consequences for procedural 
scholarship should we abandon the excesses of Anglomania. If the 
United States is viewed as a collection of ethnic groups, none of which 
has any natural right to intellectual, spiritual, or political hegemony, 
then what we need is not a spurious common culture or a fictional 
political ancestry but a genuine politics. The task of proceduralists is 
not to devise means by which the English empire might be maintained 
under American auspices as a counterforce to Russian or Third World 
ambitions, but to find ways in which individuals might form communi-
ties that could coexist without resort to any form of imperialism. 
So much for fables. 
* * * 
"One thing you learn, when you try to reconstruct an event from 
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eyewitness accounts, is that each version is just someone's story, and 
that all stories mix truth and lies." 
- Mario Vargas Llosa 
* * * 
The book under review may disappoint readers familiar with Pro-
fessor Twining's much-admired study of Karl Llewellyn and the Real-
ist Movement. This book has more modest goals: "to provide an 
introduction to Bentham's Rationale [of Judicial Evidence] and Wig-
more's Principles [of Judicial Proof], set in the context of an overview 
of the dominant tradition of Anglo-American writing about evidence." 
But despite his claim that this work is a largely "expository" introduc-
tion to the ideas of the two thinkers on which the book focuses, Profes-
sor Twining can be read with profit even by those who fancy 
themselves familiar with works he analyzes. 
The book is of particular interest to those Professor Twining calls 
"specialists on evidence," because he promises it is only one part of "a 
broader project on theoretical aspects of evidence and proof in litiga-
tion." If this initial foray is an accurate indication of what is to follow, 
we have reason for hope - and fear. For those who favor the televi-
sion style of reviewing, the conclusion here is "strong on Bentham, 
weak on Wigmore, provocative on everything else." To American 
eyes, Twining is more a Bryce than a Toqueville - too close to our 
legal culture to give a foreign perspective to readers in the United 
States and too far from it to be a reliable guide for readers in the 
United Kingdom. Since writers who are thus situated are more likely 
to be used or abused than appreciated, we can hope for his sake, if not 
ours, that in his future work Professor Twining will take the advice of 
a popular Sun Belt bumper sticker whose local version reads: "Wel-
come to California - now go home!" 
* * * 
"There you go again!" 
- Ronald Reagan 
* * * 
The first of the four chapters that make up this short but densely 
packed book is entitled "The Rationalist Tradition of evidence schol-
arship." It is divided into two parts, the second of which is a model of 
the "Rationalist Tradition." That model can be more profitably dis-
cussed in connection with the concluding chapter in which Twining 
attempts to assess its contemporary significance. Here we consider 
only the first part of the chapter, containing what Twining calls the 
"general outlines" of the "intellectual history" of evidence law. 
All readers will benefit from Twining's sketch of the history of evi-
dence scholarship in the United States and England. American evi-
dence experts will find here both unfamiliar facts and new light on 
familiar facts. For example, I was unaware that most of Taylor's Eng-
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lish treatise was cribbed from Greenleaf's American work. I also 
found that Twining's assessment of Chamberlayne's treatise enhanced 
my own appreciation of that "interesting and underrated" (I would 
have said "forgotten") writer. 
This first chapter also contains some evidence that more than a 
hyphen bifurcates what Wigmore liked to call the "Anglo-American 
System of Evidence." However valuable that book may be to English 
lawyers, few American scholars are going to share Twining's high 
opinion of Cross on Evidence. Conversely, his dismissal of McCor-
mick's work as "pedestrian" will not do much for Twining's credibil-
ity among those of us fortunate enough to have read the McCormick 
hornbook before it was butchered by its revisors. This is not to say 
that Twining's judgements are misguided; only that they are English 
opinions and that perceptions on his side of the Atlantic may not ac-
cord with those in the New World. 
* * * 
"Here I go again, I hear a trumpet blow again .... " 
- Taking a Chance on Love 
* * * 
So this guy Twining thinks the rules of evidence "have diminished 
in scope and declined in importance over the years." He should sit at 
my desk, buried beneath the flow of cases, statutes, and commentary 
that ruin my evenings and rot my mind. I don't know what they are 
doing in "jolly old England," but our courts, state and federal, easily 
turn out more than a thousand significant evidence decisions each 
year, and there are probably twice that number of routine appellate 
opinions on evidence. That doesn't include what we have palmed off 
on the boys in Con. Law IV - Mapp, Miranda, and a host of lesser-
known constitutional rules that use exclusion of evidence as a sanc-
tion. Indeed, if we hadn't ceded most of the fourth and fifth amend-
ments to the Con. Law Mafia there would be no time left in our 
courses for hearsay and relevance. Moreover, we don't have to worry 
about the Parol Evidence Rule, a doctrine that nowadays lies 
"amoldering" in the domain of Contracts, but once was within the 
province of Wigmore. 
Come to think of it, our boy Twining has an odd notion of the 
relative importance of the various venues in which evidence scholars 
flourish. He seems to think that only treatise writers matter and that 
scholars whose medium was the law review article have been of little 
influence. I'll bet most American evidence teachers have read more 
pages of Eddie Morgan's articles than they have of Wigmore's treatise. 
In those instances in which the two writers placed their formidable 
reputations on opposite sides of some line, Morgan's views have come 
off victorious as often as Wigmore's. Funny - that he should take 
Wigmore as his subject when Morgan was a much more thorough-
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going Benthamite and far more typical of American evidence scholars 
than the idiosyncratic Dean. Maybe he thinks Morgan had no theory 
of evidence. I wonder what definition of "theory" would lead him to 
that conclusion? 
* * * 
"What's it all about, Alfie?" 
- popular song of the sixties 
* * * 
In the first chapter and elsewhere, Professor Twining refers to "in-
tellectual history" in a manner that might lead the reader to think that 
he imagines that this work is of that genre. If so, he here takes a 
constricted view of "intellectual history." To be sure, he discusses in-
tellectuals who are now figures of history, but his efforts to trace the 
influence of and the influences upon these thinkers tend to be simplis-
tic and dogmatic. For all that appears in this chapter, one would 
think that Twining supposes that writers on evidence were influenced 
only by each other and not by the philosophical and political battles of 
their time. One need not be a Marxist to speculate about the effect 
which the remarkable changes in the material world in the last 200 
years have had on the theory and practice of evidence and proof. One 
hopes that in his future writing Twining will return to that broader 
view of the demands of "intellectual history" that marked his earlier 
works. 
One advantage to the narrow view is that it does less to endanger 
Twining's intellectual agenda than would a more comprehensive ap-
proach. The latter would strain Twining's knowledge of American 
culture and history to the point where he might have to question the 
utility of his conception of an "Anglo-American law of evidence." It 
is, for example, to be expected that an Englishman would see nothing 
remarkable in the fact that the leading American evidence writers all 
have names suggesting an ancestry in the British Isles. There is no 
Levine, Esposito, or Vataha in Twining's Pantheon of Great Thinkers 
in Evidence. This is significant - though not surprising, because the 
law school that harbored the likes of Thayer and Morgan was, during 
the period of their greatest influence, eagerly engaged in excluding 
Jews, Italians, and Slavs from its student body. Little wonder, then, 
that Twining finds a "remarkable continuity" with English evidentiary 
thought in the writing of the Harvard evidence scholars. 
* * * 
The hope that Twining will eventually come back to a more expan-
sive view of intellectual history is fanned by what we find in the second 
and longest chapter of the book, entitled simply "Bentham on Evi-
dence." It opens with a psycho-biographical fragment speculating 
that Bentham's views on procedure were skewed by a childhood fear 
of ghosts, a compelled conformity to religious dogma during his stay 
1210 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 85:1204 
at Oxford, and his reading of the memoirs of an ex-courtesan who 
found that Bleak House could be as ruinous and much less lively than 
the whorehouse. This quasi-Freudian frolic is followed by an account 
of how Bentham was brought to his work on procedure and evidence 
by his explicit agenda of broader political reform. 
Twining's explanation of Bentham's deeper motives is plausible, 
but a writer with a greater enthusiasm for Freudian analysis might 
think that a more convincing account should focus on Bentham's sex-
uality and his relations with his father. Bentham pe're was a successful 
lawyer with similar aspirations for his son. But Bentham apparently 
lacked the temperament for the bar, and his failure as a barrister 
might suggest that in attacking lawyers and judges he was striking 
back at his father. Bentham never married, and the biographies I have 
read seem to assume that his sexuality was of the Schubertian rather 
than the Tchaikovskian mode. Bentham's panopticon prison was of a 
design that would have enabled its warden to prevent the occupants 
from sodomizing each other. This suggests that Bentham foresaw that 
penitentiaries would share some of the problems of English public 
schools, but it does not tell us whether he feared only rape or would 
have also barred consensual homosexual encounters. Whatever his 
sexual preferences, the fetish for control exhibited in his writings sug-
gests that his was a highly repressive personality. 
The introductory section of the second chapter concludes with a 
brief description of Bentham's sources that is probably too short and 
dogmatic to have meaning to anyone not already quite familiar with 
Bentham and the writers Twining thinks have influenced him. The 
next twenty pages are taken up with "an analytical precis of the Ra-
tionale of Judicial Evidence." Though I have not read that work as 
recently or as thoroughly as Professor Twining, his summary of it 
strikes me as accurate and as probably of more use to most of us than 
the original. 
The remaining (and largest) part of Chapter Two consists of a 
more detailed critique of what Twining thinks of as five central themes 
in Bentham's work: i.e., his model procedural system; his attempt to 
devise a method for quantifying probative worth; his skepticism con-
cerning the value of rules of evidence (what Twining insists on calling 
"the anti-nomian thesis" long before he bothers to explain to his read-
ers what he means by this); his argument that defects in the system 
were the result of a corrupt self-interest of judges and lawyers; and a 
relentlessly instrumental treatment of procedure. The chapter on Ben-
tham concludes with an account of reviews of his work by two of his 
contemporaries. 
While this chapter can be read with profit by anyone with an inter-
est in evidence and proof, it is especially valuable for American schol-
ars who would like to escape (or at least not passively succumb to) the 
April-May 1987] The Ideology of Evidence 1211 
dominant procedural ideology. Because Twining's efforts to criticize 
and modernize Bentham are based on the Benthamite ideology, we get 
two different and highly revealing accounts for the price of one. 
Thoughtful proceduralists will want to have their own copy of the 
book to underline and annotate, to reread and ponder. 
It is an advantage for American proceduralists to come to Ben-
tham through Twining's paraphrase, where we do not have before us 
the obsolete procedural targets of Bentham's copious wrath and can-
not hear his dated locutions. Encountering Bentham anachronistically 
is like a blind date with an ex-spouse; what we lose of the fear and fire 
of the exotic is more than compensated for by the charm of seeing the 
familiar in an unexpected place. We recognize at once how much the 
procedural ideology that has been called "The Progressive Paradigm" 
is simply Benthamism with a Boston accent. Seeing the original im-
pulses unchastened by a century or more of attempted implementation 
makes the flaws more apparent than when the same ideas reappear in 
their contemporary disguises. 
Bentham assumed that enforcement of the substantive law was fre-
quently frustrated by an inability to reconstruct historical facts - a 
failing fostered by the exclusionary rules of evidence. His solution to 
this supposed problem was to admit more evidence ... and more evi-
dence ... and more. His faith in the curative powers of information 
reminds me of a computer salesman or one of those sincere sellers of 
the Encyclopedia Britannica. One suspects that had he ever tried a 
case Bentham would have learned that most litigated disputes do not 
involve questions of "pure" fact but are fought instead over such in-
separably fused masses of fact and value as "negligence," "reckless-
ness," and "intent." Indeed, a litigant's insistence on the purely 
factual nature of the dispute often masks a weak position on the nor-
mative aspects in issue. What counts as "evidence" of such "facts" is 
less often determined by evidentiary doctrine than it is by the ideologi-
cal presuppositions of the judge or jury. All of which is to say that 
frustration of the substantive law is most often the result of its willful 
manipulation by one or both parties or its lack of congruence with 
popular values - and not a consequence of evidence rules, however 
stupid they may be. 
Even were the issues more frequently factual, Bentham's mania for 
masses of evidence is misplaced. A presidential commission, several 
trials, and scores of books analyzing the available evidence have only 
served to confuse the important factual questions surrounding the as-
sassination of President Kennedy. Seven decades after Wigmore 
clashed with Frankfurter over the question, it seems unlikely that we 
will ever know for certain whether or not Sacco and Vanzetti were 
guilty of what must surely be one of the most studied robberies in 
Western history. Perhaps in his time there was some justification for 
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Bentham's hyperbolic prescription, "[S]ee every thing that is to be 
seen; hear every body who is likely to know any thing about the mat-
ter." Today it is apparent that the man who wrote the book on falla-
cies missed one; i.e., the argument that "if a little bit is good, a whole 
lot more is better" - what is called, in the parts of America Twining 
has yet to visit, "the Hugh Hefner fallacy." 
Bentham was also procedurally na1ve in failing to foresee how eas-
ily judges and lawyers could turn his favored reforms into technicali-
ties of the same sort as those they were meant to displace. Bentham 
was, for example, an enthusiastic proponent of the rationality of cross-
examination; as Twining puts it, he sought to "preserve and extend" 
the admirable English practice of "cross-examination face to face." 
But the desire to "preserve and extend" the right of cross-examination 
was to produce, over the next century, the hearsay rule and its allied 
exceptions, a bit of technicality as filthy as any of those that Bentham 
railed against. 
Bentham prefigured the Progressive Proceduralists in another im-
portant way - his fanatic statism. If Twining's psycho-history is 
sound, Bentham embraced the State in order to escape the clutches of 
the Church, much as American proceduralists today cling to govern-
ment as protection against the power of the business corporation. 
Both were unable to see the symbiosis that made the public-private 
distinction little more than a mask for interests likely to remain en-
trenched in any social structure short of true anarchy. 
For Twining, the central paradox in Bentham's work is "how the 
most expansive and radical of our theorists of evidence belongs to the 
mainstream of an intellectual tradition that is characterized by a nar-
row focus and an optimism bordering on complacency about the ra-
tionality of judicial processes." That's not how it looks from here. 
Indeed, with appropriate emendations, this "paradox" could be made 
to fit the fate of thinkers as diverse as Augustine and Marx. 
A more revealing question is how a man who believed that 
"[e]xperience is the foundation of all our knowledge," who used the 
fable of the king of Siam's disbelief in ice to illustrate the subjectivity 
of individual experience, who recognized that our knowledge of histor-
ical facts could aspire to nothing more than probability, and who un-
derstood how beliefs could be manipulated by those in power, could 
possibly elevate "pursuit of truth in adjudication above nearly all other 
competing claims of value or policy." 
Since what we may call "the problem of pluralism" - how people 
with competing values, beliefs, and interests can coexist in a social 
world of limited physical and intellectual means - is one of the more 
vexing issues in politics, it is amazing to hear that "there is very little 
overtly political ... about [Bentham's] writings on evidence." But 
from another point of view, this is quite expected. One of the major 
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achievements (or aspirations) of Bentham and modem proceduralists 
was to convince people that there are apolitical solutions to political 
problems. 
One technical solution to the problem of pluralism is the discovery 
of a single (usually called "objective'') truth that all people will, or 
must, accept. While this search has baffled and entertained thinkers 
throughout recorded history, such successes as have been achieved 
seem to have been highly localized in space-time. According to Twin-
ing, Bentham was not overly sanguine about the possibilities of univer-
salizing these temporary and local successes. 
We may deduce from Twining's account that Bentham was well 
aware of the political nature of his procedural projects. They followed 
closely upon the failure of his panopticon scheme, a plan by which 
Bentham hoped to get rich from the labor of prisoners in a dungeon 
more totalitarian than even modem despots have found to be practica-
ble. Bentham's proceduralism was also heavily influenced by the 
French Revolution, a fairly bloody illustration of the problem of plu-
ralism. Fear of uncontrolled subjectivity lies close to the surface of 
Bentham's lust for codification as well as his passion for procedure. It 
is, therefore, highly ironic that Twining should accuse Bentham's op-
ponents of practicing a "politics of mistrust." 
To Bentham, "security is ... the principle object" of the law be-
cause it "is the only one which necessarily embraces the future" and 
"implies extension in point of time, with respect to all the benefits to 
which it is applied." (If we recognize that "embrace" was a more 
erotic term in those days, the allusion to the popular male fantasy of 
immortality through sexual potency sticks out of this passage like a 
sore . . . thumb?) Security required that the uncertainty of the com-
mon law be replaced by the comparative certainty of a codified sub-
stantive law whose contours were, it seems, to be determined 
according to the principle of utility rather than the practice of politics. 
How did Bentham expect to keep politics from intruding into the ad-
ministration of his codified substantive law? 
Bentham's answer was to degrade procedure from its prior posi-
tion of equality in the legal enterprise to a position subordinate to the 
substantive law. To Bentham, even "adjective law" implied too much 
influence for procedure. He insisted that procedural rules had to be 
cleansed of all potentially modifying values and governed by nothing 
more ambitious than a subservient instrumentalism. His purely in-
strumental view of procedure led Bentham to oppose the privilege 
against self-incrimination and to favor the limited use of torture. 
Now that the consequences of Benthamite thinking are all around 
us, it is clear that Bentham's procedural achievement was not the 
cleansing of values and the elimination of politics from the adjective 
law, but rather the embedding of a particular set of politico-ethical 
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values within the very definition of procedure. The ethos was control; 
the politics was hierarchical statism. Twining thinks Bentham's cri-
tique bears comparison to that of "a modem Marxist." Perhaps. But 
"proto-Stalinist" would be more like it. Both the Russian dictator and 
Mrs. Thatcher would be glad to pin a medal on the man who advo-
cated abolishing the attorney-client privilege while favoring an expan-
sive privilege for "state secrets." 
Where did his views on evidence fit into Bentham's statist politics? 
He favored abolition of all rules of evidence (these conferred upon law-
yers a limited power to control the trial) and their replacement by an 
illusory right to introduce as much evidence as the parties chose. Af-
ter viewing this mass of evidence, the judge (Bentham opposed juries) 
would process it into an official "truth" by seeing which party's view 
of the facts conformed to His Honor's view of "the established course 
of nature." It was this kind of "truth" that Bentham claimed was the 
only justified goal of adjudication. 
Bentham's view of this official "truth" was purely instrumental -
as they say today, "Will it play in Peoria?" The only evil he could see 
in the conviction of an innocent person was that this flaw in official 
"truth" might become so widely known that it would detract from the 
legitimacy of the judge's claim to be the servant of truth rather than 
the toady of power. Thus, in Bentham's degraded view of politics what 
we see is not real people with conflicting values but images contesting 
for the title of "truth." Bentham would have been at home in the 
world of televised political campaigns, consumer-surveyed "news," 
and psychologically screened jurors. 
This political analysis of Bentham's procedural ideology explains 
his opposition to the compromise of disputes. In the Benthamite 
world, all sorts of evils flow from permitting private, voluntary resolu-
tion of disputes. If the terms of the settlement vary from what the 
court would have decreed, this cheats the state of the power to control 
the conduct of its citizens through legal rules. Moreover, compromise 
involves citizens in accepting falsehoods, or setting themselves up as 
the arbiters of "truth," or worst of all, understanding that since there 
is no "objective truth" to rescue them, they will have to come to some 
political resolution of their conflict. 
The models (or metaphors) that Bentham uses to make his version 
of totalitarianism more palatable would support the hypothesis that 
his desire for a politics of control sprang from a fear of the subjectivity 
of truths or values. In Twining's revealing description, for Bentham 
"[n]either foreign models nor Utopian ideas are needed; every man's 
family, the Saxon county courts and the sheriff's courts and borough 
courts in Scotland provide adequate models for 'a perfect system.'" 
Here we see foreshadowed the racist provincialism of modem Britain 
- and many of its former colonies. All of Bentham's models involve 
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disputes arising from homogeneous groups. East Indians, Pakistanis, 
red-necks, and Catholics are conveniently excluded from the "perfect 
system." His vision of the state-as-family was seen as dictatorial by 
Bentham's contemporaries long before this was demonstrated by the 
courts of some socialist states and by modem American juvenile 
courts. 
* * * 
"Monotonous! Monotonous!" 
- Eartha Kitt 
* * * 
Twining's third chapter - "Wigmore on Proof" - is less enlight-
ening for American readers, but may be more provocative than his 
discussion of Bentham. The central thesis of this chapter - that Wig-
more's The Science of Judicial Proof is an unjustly neglected theoreti-
cal work of great power - will probably strike most American 
evidence teachers as about as eccentric as Twining's opinion that Wig-
more's treatise has been "eclipsed" in many areas by McCormick's 
horribly mangled hombook or by the volumes on the Federal Rules of 
Evidence by Judge Weinstein and Professor Berger. (The next time 
Professor Twining visits these shores, one of his Anglophile buddies 
should sit him down in front of Lexis or W estlaw and show him how 
to hit the "Wigmore" button.) Fortunately for his readers, the argu-
ments Twining advances in support of his questionable hypothesis are 
not so screwy that they can be dismissed as the casual observations of 
a visiting crank. Trying to figure out just where one as obviously intel-
ligent as Twining went wrong turns out to be a rewarding, even 
though unsuccessful, enterprise. One may even conclude that in a far 
different sense than he intended, Twining is right. 
A noticeable difference between this chapter and the one on Ben-
tham is the absence of any attempt at psycho-biography. Instead of 
looking into his personal history, Twining attempts to discern Wig-
more's character from a building constructed at Northwestern Univer-
sity Law School while Wigmore was its dean. Twining deduces from 
this evidence that Wigmore had a persona split between that of a sys-
tematic legal scholar and what Twining calls a "folksy American intel-
lectual tourist." The last two words are better directed at the author 
than at his subject. Only an English academic would find Dean Wig-
more's regime at Northwestern to have been "eccentric" or would 
think that "folksy" was an apt description of the stuffy elitist who 
emerges from the pages of his biography. Twining accuses Wigmore's 
biographer of simply compiling "a mass of information," but the facts 
that Twining selects for his own biographical note, while more exten-
sive than in the case of Bentham, are not particularly salient for an 
understanding of Wigmore's ideological preferences. 
* * * 
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"I thought that cards were a frame-up I never would try .... '' 
- Taking a Chance on Love 
* * * 
Wigmore was born in San Francisco at the time of the Civil War. 
The son of a wealthy lumber dealer, he also suffered the attentions of a 
doting mother who insisted that her husband move the whole family 
to Massachusetts when her favorite son decided to matriculate at 
Harvard. While other influences surely shaped Wigmore's outlook, it 
would be a mistake to overlook the trauma of having been, first, a 
"momma's boy" who could not survive in the public schools of San 
Francisco, and then a Californian in Cambridge. 
If, as seems likely, Wigmore was scorned by his youthful peers as a 
"sissy," this would provide a partial explanation for his lifelong con-
cern with matters of personal appearance and his rigid adherence to 
social conventions. (Wigmore once came unglued because his wife 
had ventured out of doors without a hat.) One can easily imagine 
what this "dandy" from the West had to endure from his hyper-
sophisticate Eastern and Southern classmates when he showed up at 
Harvard with a California accent and Momma hovering in the wings. 
Little wonder that he became a workaholic library "nerd" with few 
outside interests and suffered a physical (and emotional?) breakdown 
during his third year of law school. This might also explain why the 
"hick" from San Francisco became a driven cosmopolitan who could 
read or speak a dozen foreign languages. A longing to erase earlier 
imputations of effeminacy is suggested by Wigmore's martial enthusi-
asms and his desire to be addressed as "Colonel" rather than "Dean." 
A fanatical Freudian could easily see Wigmore's hasty marriage 
and acceptance of a teaching post in Japan, both opposed by his par-
ents, as efforts to escape the clutches of both his real mother and his 
alma mater. The fact that he spent his entire academic career in Chi-
cago could be explained by a need to position himself at an equidis-
tance, both culturally and geographically, between San Francisco and 
Cambridge - those terrifying symbols of maternal power. Finally, a 
resentment at his own father's apparent inability to prevent his son's 
emasculation could provide a motive for Wigmore's filial piety toward 
powerful judges. 
Like Bentham, Wigmore had little experience as a lawyer and, so 
far as I have been able to determine, neither of the "great theorists" of 
evidence ever tried a case. Worse yet, both were childless. Children 
have a remarkable capacity for tempering exuberance regarding the 
possibilities of rational governance, even of the most paternalistic 
kind. Wigmore's political beliefs may also have been influenced by the 
experiences of his boyhood chum, Abraham Ruef, whom Wigmore 
once joined in a group to study civic problems in his native city. Ruef 
later became the colorfully corrupt political boss of San Francisco and 
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eventually earned a place among the citations in his old friend's trea-
tise under the category of "other crimes" evidence in cases of bribery. 
Twining describes Wigmore as a "conservative," but can be no 
more specific about his politics than to suggest that some of his views 
"alienated liberals." His biographer was surprised that Wigmore con-
sidered himself a Democrat, but we can avoid such anachronistic 
amazement if we recall that Ruef was a Republican and Stephen J. 
Field, another ex-San Franciscan whose hostility toward left radical-
ism resembled Wigmore's, spent much of his career on the Supreme 
Court lusting after the Democratic presidential nomination. Wig-
more, like Field, was a rabid red-baiter, attacking Felix Frankfurter 
for giving aid and comfort to the cause of Sacco and Vanzetti. He also 
supported the lawless actions against the left carried out by the infa-
mous Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer. Wigmore not only re-
fused to debate civil liberties with Roger Baldwin, but also tried to 
prevent the founder of the American Civil Liberties Union and Clar-
ence Darrow from speaking at Northwestern. Dean Wigmore forced 
his students to sign a loyalty oath, but felt that academic freedom 
barred student criticism of his own poor teaching. 
Wigmore, like most of Bentham's modem American disciples, was 
an elitist. He blamed many of the law's problems on the admission of 
the "hoi polloi" to the bar and the elevation of some lawyers of hum-
ble origins to the bench. Wigmore opposed the election of judges and 
thought that it would raise the standards of the bar if steps were taken 
at Northwestern to make it more difficult for students of modest 
means to matriculate there. His definition of "democracy" was "the 
progress of all under the leadership of the wisest and the best." 
Given these attitudes, Wigmore's preference for bureaucratic gov-
ernment and his contempt for legislative politics is quite natural. Pre-
dictably, he thought military justice was superior to that which could 
be found in civilian criminal courts, and he once strayed so far from 
the anticlericalism of Cambridge as to admire the hierarchical politics 
of the Roman Catholic church. In later years, his paternalistic notions 
of government led him to praise Mussolini as "the Roosevelt of Italy" 
and to insist that "fascism has saved Italy." Is it possible that his 
desire to see America led by a similar "bold genius" reflected a yearn-
ing for the support he felt had been denied him by his own father? 
(This is silly stuff - but is it any sillier than most of what passes 
for psycho-biography? The point is not to be intimidated by "intellec-
tual history." It is a game that can be played, even solitaire, by any-
one; all that is required is a pack of lies and a Pound of malice.) 
* * * 
In Chapter Three, after his sketch of Wigmore's personality and an 
attempt to assess his place in the history of evidentiary scholarship, 
Twining turns to a comparison of Wigmore and Bentham, persua-
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sively demonstrating that their similarities are more salient than their 
obvious differences. There follows a section on "the genesis and con-
ception" of Wigmore's The Principles of Judicial Proof, describing 
what Wigmore hoped to accomplish with this volume and trying to 
explain its relationship to the more massive and familiar treatise. Only 
then does Professor Twining get to the heart of his argument; namely, 
that Wigmore's reductive and inductive creed offers a "comprehensive 
interdisciplinary theory of evidence and proof, which incorporates the 
legal, logical, psychological and scientific aspects of the subject within 
a single coherent framework." 
Sensing that in this battle he is badly outmanned (though not out-
weaponed), Twining opens hostilities with a preemptive strike against 
actual and potential opponents. Those who fail to understand the 
merits of Wigmore's methodology must, according to Twining, be 
either (a) conservative, (b) too literal, (c) lazy, (d) irrational, or (e) all 
of the above. He obviously has my number. To avoid any massive 
retaliation, my counterattack consists of a series of "surgical strikes" 
at carefully selected targets. 
* * * 
Twining suggests that Wigmore believed that his analysis provided 
"a systematic reconstruction of what good trial lawyers do all the 
time," a view Twining apparently shares. Of course, theorists always 
hope that their ideas are of practical as well as academic use. But 
since Wigmore was never a trial lawyer (and the dust jacket is silent on 
the matter ofTwining's forensic experience), one may well ask how he 
(or Twining) could know what "good trial lawyers do all the time." 
As Twining's account shows, there is no evidence that "good lawyers" 
or those aspiring to be such were buying Wigmore's Principles. More-
over, if one reads the books lawyers do buy - the "how-to-do-it" rev-
elations of notorious or merely ambitious advocates - one is hard 
pressed to find more than trivial uses of anything like Wigmorean 
analysis. This does not dispose of Twining's argument that good law-
yers are doing Wigmorean analysis, but like Monsieur Jourdan, they 
are too stupid to realize what they are up to. But it is noteworthy that 
clinical professors of law, who are devoting some effort to finding or 
developing paradigms of "good lawyering" have found Wigmore's 
book to be of limited use. But perhaps all the clinicians I know are 
lazy or irrational too. 
* * * 
Twining argues for the use of Wigmore's "chart method" of ana-
lyzing masses of evidence, claiming that it forces us to articulate all 
the steps in reasoning from the proffered evidence to the factual con-
clusion to be proved, thus insuring that "we can spot the vulnerable 
points." To illustrate the power of Wigmorean analysis, Twining uses 
the example of a murder case in which a scrap of cloth in the hand of 
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the victim matches precisely a hole tom in a coat found in the closet of 
the accused. Here are the first two steps in Twining's proposed 
Wigmorean analysis of this evidence: 
(1) The scrap of cloth fits this coat; therefore the scrap came off this 
coat; 
(2) The scrap came off this coat therefore, this coat was worn by 
someone other than the victim at the time of the assault. 
Can you spot the flaw? Twining doesn't, even though (or, perhaps, 
because) he uses scientistic symbols and numbers to assist in stating 
these two propositions. I suppose that this simply proves that I am 
one of those literalist fellows who are irrationally skeptical about 
"careful analysis." 
* * * 
The weakest element in Wigmore's "science" was his insistence 
that logic in litigation should be inductive rather than deductive. At 
this point in his defense of Wigmore, Professor Twining is in deep 
trouble ("and he knows it!") because even Wigmore had to concede 
that every step in inductive reasoning depended on an unstated as-
sumption or generalization - what would be the major premise if the 
logic of litigation were what Wigmore called "the syllogistic or deduc-
tive form." For example, to go from direct testimony that "Cain put a 
pistol to Abie's head and blew out his brains" to the factual conclusion 
"therefore Cain killed Able," we must rely on generalizations such as 
"people whose brains are scattered on the ground have a limited life 
expectancy" or "to blow someone's brains out is what the law means 
by 'kill'" or even "guns don't kill people; people kill people." 
Professor Twining understands that an insistence on inductive 
logic is inconsistent with his claim that Wigmorean analysis helps us 
spot flaws in reasoning, because one of the defects in inductive reason-
ing is that it conceals defective or weak major premises that would be 
exposed if we were forced to cast the line of proof in a syllogism. It is 
less clear that Twining sees that deductive analysis would undermine 
Wigmore's claim that there are only five modes of proof and that these 
are capable of containing any proper chain of inferences. In a footnote 
buried in the back of the book, Twining comes near to admitting that 
Wigmore was wrong. But up front, where it counts, he pretends that 
Wigmore's fetish for induction is defensible, even if deductive reason-
ing is preferable. Why does he do this? 
We must use inductive reasoning, Twining tells us, because "it is 
rarely possible in judicial proof to establish a major premiss which is 
both universal and true." Moreover, to use deductive reasoning would 
not benefit a lawyer "because it would merely shift the court's atten-
tion to the major premiss of the syllogism." This will not do because it 
would encourage "a form of skepticism ... inappropriate to the practi-
cal conduct oflitigation." Worse yet, "to harp continually on the falli-
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bility of common sense and the relativity of knowledge would be to 
open up a Pandora's box of doubts in a way that would be inimical to 
the smooth conduct of practical affairs and public confidence in the 
legal system." 
If we can translate this into plain language, what Twining here 
acknowledges is that if it ever gets out that the choice of the major 
premise is arbitrary, even political, the whole edifice of rationality 
erected around the power of the courts by Twining, Bentham, and 
Wigmore collapses. The virtue of inductive reasoning for Twining & 
Co. is that, like utilitarian (or instrumental) argument, it gives the ap-
pearance of having cleansed power of the subjectivity of values while 
actually doing no more than shoving values offstage where their influ-
ence is not visible to the suckers in the crowd. To admit that litigation 
involves conflicts of values even when the dispute is cast in terms of 
fact would be to confess that the trial is a political undertaking in 
which "truth" is manufactured, not unearthed. 
* * * 
"General knowledges are those knowledges that idiots possess." 
- William Blake 
* * * 
Twining provides an account of Wigmore's opposition to the 
Model Code of Evidence that goes well beyond the conventional expla-
nation of conservatism and turf-protection in explaining how Wig-
more split from the Progressive Proceduralists (of whom, more anon) 
over the question of reform. Yet for all its nuanced sensitivity, Twin-
ing's version remains incomplete because it omits too much of the un-
derlying politics. 
It needs to be kept in mind that reform of the rules of evidence was 
simply a minor part of a broader Progressive agenda for the redistribu-
tion of political power through procedural means. This program was 
not limited to the courts (consider the campaign for municipal reform 
that eventuated in the city-manager system of urban misrule), nor was 
it consistently antidemocratic (consider the initiative referendum and 
the recall - even of judges and judicial opinions), but it was highly 
elitist. In the case of judicial reform, the underlying thrust was toward 
a centralization of power in the judiciary and the increasing insulation 
of that power from popular control; judges were no longer to be 
elected (this was misleadingly called "taking them out of politics"), 
and they were to be given greater powers over the attorneys, parties, 
and juries. With respect to rules of evidence, as the Model Code dem-
onstrates, this meant transforming what had heretofore been rights 
(actually "powers") of exclusion in the parties into a discretionary au-
thority in the judge. 
On such technical questions of power distribution, the usual labels 
of "conservative" and "liberal" are not very helpful in describing the 
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positions of various members of the elite. Though often considered a 
"conservative," Wigmore was not unsympathetic toward the aspira-
tions of the Progressive agenda and he was certainly not opposed to 
change, even radical change, in rules of evidence. His disagreement 
with the American Law Institute was political in another sense - it 
was disagreement over the strategy and tactics of reform. As to the 
first, Wigmore felt it was a mistake to confer so much power on trial 
judges before those judges had been insulated from popular influence. 
Conversely, he assumed that once we had "better" (for which read 
"upper-crust") judges and lawyers, the need for drastic reform in the 
rules of evidence would diminish. (Twining can be pardoned for not 
realizing how politics is encoded in the Progressive lexicon; most 
American proceduralists are similarly innocent of any such political 
perceptions.) 
Wigmore also feared, correctly as it turned out, that it was a tacti-
cal mistake to propose so many sweeping reforms at a time when the 
bar had yet to be cleansed by educational reforms (the aforementioned 
exclusion of Slavs, Jews, Italians, et al., from law schools) of its "unde-
sirable elements," who in combination with bar association reactiona-
ries and fellow ethnics in the legislature had more than enough power 
not only to defeat the reforms but to discredit the reformers. It is a 
good guess that one of the reasons Wigmore proved to be the more 
astute politician and conservative reformer is that in Chicago it was 
easy to gaze out across the heartlands and see that Anglophilia had 
become little more than an oil slick on American culture - a thin but 
deadly mass that was increasingly harder to hold together. Out where 
people had cheered for the Germans in World War I and the Socialists 
in local elections, it was easier to see how the powers the Code created 
might fall into the wrong hands. 
There is, of course, more to it than this. But then, there always is, 
isn't there? 
* * * 
Although Wigmore, like others of his generation, liked to invoke 
the name of "science" to exalt his own politics, Twining tells us he 
"did not theorize much about his conception of science." The same 
could be said of Twining, but this does not inhibit him in tossing the 
word about with reckless abandon. The only sustained discussion of 
"science" and proof appears in a discussion of Wigmore's interest in 
psychology. Twining points out that Wigmore focused his attention 
on the cognitive processes of witnesses and had little interest in apply-
ing psychological analysis to the other participants in the trial. This is 
not surprising if we think about Wigmore's political agenda. He 
would not care to admit that his anxieties about the reliability of wit-
nesses could with equal justice be transferred to jurors, lawyers, or 
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(God forbid!) to judges, because this would blemish his picture of the 
trial as a scientific inquiry into "truth." 
Twining concludes that Wigmore had "a somewhat monolithic 
view of science." What he means is that Wigmore usually overlooked 
the fact that many of the "scientific" principles he espoused were the 
subject of vigorous debate among real scientists. Twining might have 
added that Wigmore, like many legal writers, appears to have been 
ignorant of the politics of science. In science, as in litigation, what 
counts as "truth" is the product of a complex set of interactions 
among ambitious people operating within a procedural framework 
that prescribes what will count as evidence and what the proper modes 
are for validating claims, all resting on and implicitly invoking a set of 
values and assumptions that are motivated as much by politics and 
habit as by rational inquiry. 
Before we consider whether Twining's views of "science" are an 
improvement on Wigmore's - a digression. 
* * * 
The title of Twining's book is Theories of Evidence. The two works 
he discusses are said to be efforts to "develop a broad general theory of 
evidence and proof." The words "theory" and "theories" are scat-
tered across its pages. Yet nowhere does Twining tell us what he 
means by "theory." This is most un-Benthamite. The old boy was 
fanatic in his insistence on the use of clear definitions in legal writing. 
It is not easy to discern his meaning from Twining's use of the 
word. At one point he says that since World War II "Wigmore's gen-
eral theory of evidence was widely thought to have been discredited." 
On the next page we are told that "he was not treated as having a 
coherent general theory" and that his treatise "does not contain an 
explicit and coherent general theory." But this is followed by the as-
sertion that his Principles of Judicial Proof "contains the most articu-
late and coherent statement of the general theory underlying all his 
writings." At one point, his claim that there has been a "resurgence of 
interest in theoretical aspects of evidence" is supported by citation to 
the glut of articles in which legal writers attempt to apply their under-
standing of mathematical theories of probability to the problem of bur-
den of proof, to the increased efforts of psychologists to say something 
useful or meaningful about the process of proof in litigation, and to the 
revision of one of Wigmore's volumes on relevance - surely a very 
mixed bag of "theory." Still later he constructs a pantheon of evi-
dence "theorists" consisting of Gilbert, Bentham, Stephen, and 
Thayer; but from my own reading of them, as well as Twining's de-
scriptions, it is clear that all of these save Bentham were concerned 
more with evidentiary doctrine than with anything like a "theory" of 
proof. 
A clue to his meaning appears in Twining's defense of Wigmore's 
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"chart method" of analyzing masses of evidence - Twining says it is 
"an excellent pedagogical vehicle for teaching rigorous analysis and 
for exploring a variety of issues in the theory of evidence." The reason 
Wigmore wants us to draw pictures of "lines of proof" is so we can see 
"why a total mass of evidence does or should persuade us to a given 
conclusion." Note the ambivalence: "does" or "should." A trial law-
yer, and a certain kind of theorist, would be quite interested in why 
evidence "does" persuade. But what kind of theorist would care about 
why it "should" have probative force? One like Twining. 
A Wigmorean chart, according to Twining, does not purport to 
depict "the actual judgements of decision-makers" but is "a rational 
reconstruction of what, in the chart-maker's view, ought to be the logi-
cal relations between the data." This sounds very much like "desire 
disguised as knowledge," which we may recall was Roberto Unger's 
definition of ideology. Is it also Twining's definition of "theory"? 
* * * 
Digression on digression. 
Wigmore's charts resemble in form and function a military battle 
plan. The army of facts is drawn up in neat lines with arrows marking 
the point of the inferential onslaught. Colonel Wigmore, however, 
was never on a real battlefield - a distinct advantage when charting 
the supposed course of battle in the war room. But as anyone who has 
ever been shot at could have told the martial Dean, the battlefield, like 
the courtroom, does not have much resemblance to a chess board. It 
is filled with contingencies and the inexplicable contrariness of cause. 
More suitable than military metaphors is one that my colleague 
Albert Moore employs in a work in progress. Instead of "lines" or 
"chains" of inferences, Moore refers to "inferential streams." This 
fluid imagery allows us to see evidence as a protean body of water that 
ranges from an inert mass that goes nowhere but impresses by its im-
mensity to a clear sparkling mountain stream, a trickle of biting frigid-
ity that follows the path of least resistance and is filled with 
unpredictable swirls and eddies (Morgan?), yet is capable of making 
an indelible impression on even the hardest rock. It warns us that the 
lawyer who attempts to dam the evidence in order to power a technol-
ogy of proof may end up doing nothing more than polluting its clarity. 
And one who tries to sail to victory on an ocean of evidence may find 
himself becalmed far from shore, battered by an unexpected typhoon, 
or carried inexorably by silent currents into the Bermuda Triangle. 
* * * 
In his only concrete discussion of "science," Twining recalls Wig-
more's well-known attack on Hugo Muensterberg for daring to sug-
gest that forensic evidentiary techniques were psychologically naive, 
then goes on to explain that while disappointed at the "inability of the 
psychologists to come up with anything of practical value to lawyers" 
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Wigmore was really sympathetic to their efforts. Twining further re-
counts Robert Maynard Hutchins' conclusion that psychologists could 
provide little that was useful to his plan for reform of the rules of 
evidence. Twining adds that "the modem reader may find it sobering 
to note how little that is really usable in everyday practice has emerged 
in the last fifty years." 
This is utilitarianism of the most fanatic sort. Psychology, we are 
to assume, is valuable only as it may be employed in the process of 
proof as it is presently conceived by lawyers and legal scholars. One is 
reminded of the generals who thought of the airplane as a new kind of 
horse. It does not occur to the instrumentalist legal thinker to wonder 
if perhaps the conclusion to be drawn from these close encounters of 
the first kind with psychology is not that psychology is barren, but 
that the rationalist conception of the trial is not particularly fruitful. 
To criticize psychologists because lawyers cannot imagine how to use 
their discoveries is like scorning Prometheus because fire does not 
make a very good blanket. 
Twining's approach to psychology nicely illustrates one of the 
many grievous side effects of the instrumental mode of thinking that 
predominates in American, and apparently English, legal thought. 
Legal scholars approach other disciplines, whether they be science or 
history, not as neophytes seeking instruction in modes of thought that 
may enable them to see legal institutions in a clearer light, but as scav-
engers bent on looting adjacent fields of inquiry for whatever weapons 
may be useful in the one-sided political struggle called "legal scholar-
ship." The Empire strikes back - again. 
But why, in our search for what is "useful" in science, should evi-
dence specialists confine their attention to psychology? Given the re-
ductive passion of the "rationalist tradition," one might have expected 
legal scholars to penetrate beyond the surface appearance of the gross 
phenomenon we call "witness" to engage the underlying reality 
through excursions into neurobiology. But even cellular reality is far 
from the truly fundamental; we must whiz beyond the molecule and 
carry our search for the Ultimate Truth down to the real nitty-gritty 
- the world of particle physics. 
At first glance, quantum mechanics would appear to be a discipline 
of great promise for Twining and his cohort of pseudo-mathematical 
truth-seekers. The world into which the physicists have plunged in 
their atom-smashing search for the fundamental units of existence is a 
weird domain populated from top to bottom with strange and colorful 
entities like the charming quarks that are endowed with such admira-
ble qualities as "truth" and "beauty." Twining should find the quan-
tum world appealing because in the land of quarks and gluons it seems 
that the ultimate truths are probabilistic, much as he and his throwers 
of computerized dice see the world of the trial. 
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But on closer inspection, the search of physicists for the "ultimate 
reality" provides not "the light of the noonday sun," but ultimate ter-
ror for the reductive analyst of legal rules. From the work done so far, 
it begins to look very much as though "there is no there, there" (hello, 
Los Angeles!), that ultimate reality (if not entirely a construct of the 
human mind) is altered by our attempts to perceive it (a thought 
frightful to ponder for theorists of "proof"), that electrons which put 
on the garb of particle and take a position when we are watching, 
begin to frolic as waves the moment our back is turned. Even the 
hardiest "truth-seeker" must falter when faced with the possibility 
that Mother Nature is exactly the kind of wily woman our fathers 
warned us about. Elusive and without the Truth in Her. 
* * * 
"Yes, my heart belongs to Dada - da-da-da-da-da-da-da-da-da 
" 
- Cole Porter 
* * * 
For Bentham and Wigmore, if not for Twining, "science" is a mere 
metaphor. Like most metaphors, it is useful precisely because of its 
ambiguity, the ability to stand for many different things in the mind of 
the writer and the reader. For example, it seems likely that Bentham 
and Wigmore often invoked "science" only as a symbol for that state 
of mind that opposes religious or popular visions of truth - what 
Bentham derided as "superstition." 
I suspect that for most contemporary legal scholars "science" is a 
metaphor of control. Faced with the daunting problems of pluralism, 
modern legal thinkers are not after that truth "that shall set ye free" to 
pursue an egalitarian politics, but after the information that is power 
and the power that is information. If "science" can master the Fruit-
ful Mother of the contingent and diverse, then surely by applying the 
methods of "science," men of the world can subdue those struggling to 
free themselves from the world of men and its scientific determination 
of their status as inferior. "Science" is thus a substitute for politics as 
a technique for engaging the tumultuous subjectivity that surrounds 
us. 
It is possible to turn the metaphor on its head (or as Real Men 
would say, "lay it on its back"). When men have attempted to control 
her, Mother Nature has proved a refractory bitch. Faced with a do-
mesticity of dominance, She responds with an indiscriminate terrorism 
that strikes the repressor and the repressed alike on fields as diverse as 
Love Canal, Chernobyl, and Mount St. Helens. The nuclear genie reg-
ularly pops the cap on the bottle, new microbes rush to fill ecological 
niches vacated by viral victims of chemical warfare, and new needs to 
kill and coddle spring up faster than consumer culture can develop 
psychological pesticides. In short, the Science of Control is as prob-
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lematic as the Politics of Control. Perhaps it is time to return to more 
primitive notions of how we relate to nature and neighbor but with a 
modem recognition that "subjectivity" and "objectivity," like Time 
and Space (or Man and Woman), are parts of a larger unity that can 
be seen only partially through reductive analysis or cosmic 
conceptions. 
* * * 
In a brief concluding chapter, Twining considers "The contempo-
rary significance of Bentham and Wigmore." Here he expresses the 
hope that rules of evidence will diminish in importance so that evi-
dence scholars, who are accused of stupidly supposing that "the sub-
ject of evidence is co-extensive with the rules of evidence," will tum 
their attention to the more important questions of theory and thereby 
rediscover how much "the rationalist tradition" has to offer. I doubt 
it. 
It seems to me that Professor Twining is wrong to suppose that the 
opponents of the instrumentalist approach to evidence are unfamiliar 
with the ideology of Bentham and Wigmore. How could we be igno-
rant of it when we are being suffocated by it? We are skeptical "about 
the idea that rigorous rationality has much to do with trial practice," 
not out of ignorance, but because we have seen, before Twining wrote 
the words, that "the Rationalist Tradition ... is rooted in a particular 
view of rationality" and that the choice of which rationality to em-
brace is a question of values; i.e., that the issue is political. Some of us 
believe that it is to the present reality of the political struggle in the 
courtroom that rules of evidence and proof are properly addressed, not 
to the reconstruction of some unknowable past or the building of some 
future utopia. We reject Wigmore and Bentham, not because we are 
lazy and irrational, but because we believe it to be both irrational and 
wrong to try to conceal values, to slide them offstage and pretend they 
have no influence on the visible drama. 
* * * 
A fact that Twining observes but does not know what to do with is 
that both Bentham and Wigmore often adopt a (noninstrumental?) 
acerbic tone in their writings. One of Bentham's early reviewers was 
"fatigued" by Bentham's "extreme polemical tones" - "such indis-
criminate, fanatical, and interminable abuse." Wigmore's teacher, 
John Chipman Grey, in his admiring notes on the treatise - a "colos-
sal book" - criticized his former pupil for "irritating faults" such as 
"abusive language" and thought it "bad grace from an unexperienced 
person" to come across as "a man volubly scolding in unfamiliar lan-
guage." Twining notes that a reviewer faulted Bentham for "bad di-
plomacy" in "making lawyers the scapegoats" of his critique, just as 
McCormick once thought that it was not sound strategy for Wigmore 
to "lash the judges ... with the whip of scorn." Yet ironically it was 
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lawyers who carried many of Bentham's procedural reforms to frui-
tion and judges who made Wigmore's tone so authoritative that fifty 
years after his death his language has been preserved intact while the 
gentle McCormick's hornbook has been hacked to pieces by an irrev-
erent mob of revisors who did not blush at having the ghost embrace 
ideas that the man had rejected during his life. 
Twining also notes that Wigmore wrote "in a magisterial style 
which suggests that there is little scope for argument or doubt" and 
that "[h]is views were clearcut, forcefully expressed and not always 
entirely consistent." Bentham, too, Twining tells us, relied on "the 
sustained, indeed relentless, application of a few simple ideas." He 
might have added that this avowed "rationalist" made much use of 
rhetoric and ridicule in his arguments, dismissing opposing arguments 
as "the Chinese Argument," "the fox-hunter's reason," and (goodness 
gracious!) "the old woman's reason." 
To Twining, these excesses suggest that Bentham fell into his own 
category of "vituperative personalities." Readers with some acquain-
tance with theological discourse may think it more to the point to see 
Bentham and Wigmore as practitioners of "the prophetic style." Both 
of these "theorists" hope to persuade by prophecy, to hint at coming 
doom and point the path to redemption in hopes that readers would 
choose Heaven over Hell. Like most successful prophets, their specifi-
cations of calamity tended to be vague; nothing is more destructive of 
the power of prophecy than to have predicted last Tuesday as the day 
of Armegeddon. Similarly their schemes for salvation were so extreme 
that there was little danger that they would ever be tried and found 
wanting. As the Free Marketeers insist, partial implementation is not 
an adequate foundation for disproof. 
There is some evidence that Bentham saw himself as the destroyer 
of the Established Paganism and the prophet of a new scientistic reli-
gion. In The Rationale of Judicial Evidence he wrote: "Near 300 
years has religion had her Luther. No Luther of Jurisprudence is yet 
come; no penetrating eye and dauntless heart have as yet searched into 
the cells and conclave of jurisprudence." Not until Bentham, who ad-
ded to his self-portrait the hope that the Profit of Jurisprudence would 
find a "new path to fame" by combining "the talent of Blackstone ... 
with the sagacity and probity of a Father Paul." Aware that the New 
Church would need relics, Bentham had his own body posthumously 
stuffed and mounted on a chair, suggesting that it should thereafter be 
venerated at gatherings of the faithful. It is a shame that Twining did 
not use photographs of this "auto-icon" and of Wigmore's mausoleum 
at Northwestern to adorn the dustjacket of his book instead of the 
unrevealing portraits of the two "theorists" that now appear there. 
It is hard to explain why Twining does not see "the Rationalist 
Tradition" as another religion, a cult of control. In his book on the 
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Legal Realists, he quotes Holmes' put-down of Langdell as a "theolo-
gian," describes the Harvard Law School as the seat of a "legal theol-
ogy," and recognizes that for many of the Realists law was merely "a 
means of social control." Here, however, he treats the two prophets of 
the sado-masochistic sect as expounding a scientific theory of proof 
rather than a credo of control. 
* * * 
In the Western way of thinking, every church must have a Credo. 
Since neither the Father nor the Son seems to have provided one for 
the True Believers in Evidentiary Instrumentalism, Brother Twining 
has derived one from his scrutiny of the sacred texts. He calls his 
creed "The Rationalist Tradition" and sets it forth in a series of pro-
positions and a "rationalist model of adjudication" that spreads across 
four pages in the first chapter. Anticipating the attacks of schismatics, 
Twining divides the followers of Bentham and Wigmore into the as-
pirational, the optimistic, and the complacent. As in any theology, 
one assumes that the greatest number of clerics falls into the last 
group. My concern here, however, is not with niceties of doctrine or 
internecine struggles over the power to excommunicate, but rather 
with a sociological analysis of this dogma; that is, I wish to examine 
the practices of the complacent rather than the optimistic or aspira-
tional rhetoric of the concerned. 
For a number of years I have been engaged in a participant-ob-
server study of the American branch of this sect. By watching both 
what its practitioners do and say when not practicing theology, I have 
drawn certain conclusions concerning the operational, as distinct from 
the aspirational, tenets of their faith. I set these tenets forth as a set of 
propositions resembling in some slight degree those of Brother Twin-
ing, hoping that this will not be seen as blasphemous, in an attempt to 
show how the religion-in-practice complements as often as it contra-
dicts the canon according to Twining. 
* * * 
Brother, can you paradigm? 
* * * 
(1) The supreme value is the survival of the species. (Of course, 
there is room for disagreement as to who counts as a member of the 
species and whether or not the continuation of the chemical compo-
nents of existing specimens can be considered "survival.") 
(2) The highest human characteristic is rationality because it is 
this quality that permits us to dominate nature, be dominated by other 
men, and, thus to survive as a species. 
(3) Rationality is a scarce commodity, and it has been unequally 
distributed among existing components of the species. (There is much 
dispute about the degree to which both scarcity and inequality are nat-
ural arrangements or social conveniences.) 
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( 4) Rationality cannot be satisfactorily defined to the satisfaction 
of all and the underendowed have great difficulty in comprehending its 
magnificence, but those who possess it can recognize it in themselves 
and in others. (It is for this reason that rationality is sometimes 
equated with pornography or, to use the legal term, obscenity.) 
(5) Force is the great enemy of rationality because the capacity to 
use it has not, historically at least, had any direct and positive correla-
tion with the capacity for rational thought. 
(6) The function of government is to conscript force into the ser-
vice of rationality. (There is a much-disputed corollary that rational 
men have no need for, indeed are exempt from, government; even 
more controversial is the proposition that if all men were rational 
there would be no government.) 
(7) Democracy is a procedural device (or ceremony) in which ra-
tionality bows (or appears to bow) to force. (Here, too, there is dis-
pute between those who think the procedure can be dispensed with 
when rationality has commandeered sufficient force and those who 
have a nostalgic fondness for obsolete procedures or persistent doubts 
about the sufficiency or trustworthiness of the available force.) 
(8) The most important product of government is order, defined as 
"behavior that follows expected modes of thought and action." (The 
expectations are, of course, those of the rational.) 
(9) The great enemy of order is disputes because, in disputing, un-
expected thoughts or actions are manifested or incited. 
(10) There are two kinds of dispute - rational and irrational. 
(11) Rational disputes usually (perhaps exclusively) involve the 
ownership or entitlement to scarce material resources; disputes over 
limitless resources like the air or opinions, and disputes involving 
questions of subjective values, are irrational. 
(12) The major task of procedure is to deploy a limited amount of 
rationality so as to obtain the maximum possible order. 
(13) A rational procedure provides separate methods (and institu-
tions) for rational and irrational disputes, committing greater amounts 
of rationality to those institutions that handle rational disputes and 
lesser amounts to those whose subject is subjectivity. 
(14) In our culture, institutions for resolving rational disputes are 
called "courts"; those that traffic in irrationality are called "legisla-
tures." (The executive is an agency that combines rationality and 
force and it is the fallback institution for those disputes that cannot be 
adequately disposed of by courts or legislatures or both.) 
(15) Rational disputes may be true or feigned. 
(16) A true rational dispute arises when one or more of the parties 
has an honest but irrational set of expectations or an unwitting false 
perception of events, or both. In a feigned dispute either the asserted 
expectation or claimed perception is knowingly false. 
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(17) The goal of litigation is to punish those who feign disputes 
and to correct the false expectations or perceptions of honest 
disputants. 
(18) An expectation or perception is false if it does not conform to 
established standards of expectations or perceptions. 
(19) Established standards of expectations are called "The Law"; 
established standards of perception are called "The Truth." (It was 
once thought that The Law was the province of Experts, but that any-
one could know The Truth; this now seems to have been disproved by 
The Experts.) . 
(20) The only function of a trial is to create and enforce The 
Truth. 
(21) The purpose of rules of evidence is to foster the Basic Truth. 
(22) The Basic Truth is that the social world consists of 
(a) material objects and events that can be perceived in a single uni-
form fashion by all rational men (and, lately, women), save those who 
suffer defects in their perceptual organs, and (b) imaginary substances 
called values that are unfortunate vestiges of our former existence as 
animals, retaining a stronger or weaker grip on individual members of 
the species as a function of their progress up the evolutionary ladder to 
the Nirvana of Pure Materiality. 
On second thought . . . this is all useless because Twining could 
undoubtedly prove, as he did in the case of the Legal Realists, that 
nobody believes all this stuff. They don't, do they? 
* * * 
"We all live in a Yellow Submarine." 
-Lennon 
* * * 
We may now return to the question that has troubled us (that's 
"U.S.," folks) from the beginning of his book; namely, why Professor 
Twining is at pains to insist on such a thing as the "Rationalist Tradi-
tion" if, as he also wants to argue, that decidedly wet blanket covers 
anyone who ever wrote on the subject of evidence in the English 
language? 
My first suspicion was that the category had imperial motivations; 
that is, Twining wanted to obtain for himself a right to censure Ameri-
can courts that he had not earned by reading the cases. If Bentham 
were the Pope of Evidence, then Twining as an agent of the Vatican 
was in a better position to sniff out heresy in the provinces than local 
priests whose nostrils might be too acclimated to exotic odors to detect 
the first whiff of unorthodoxy. 
My second conjecture was similar, though in some respects the re-
verse of the first; that is, Twining invokes an Anglo-American empire 
of evidence to arm himself against domestic foes. In other words, like 
Mrs. Thatcher, he is well aware that it is England that is now the 
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colony and that the path to personal power and profit is collaboration 
with the conqueror. This scenario also has its moral aspect since in a 
peculiar way it makes us all Quislings but allows Twining the ethically 
superior position of having betrayed his countrymen to a real rather 
than an imaginary power. 
But if Twining is to be trusted, neither of these scenarios seems to 
work because according to him the Rationalist Tradition has no foes 
or heretics. This is, at the very least, bad drama. Every neophyte 
playwright is told that drama requires Conflict, that Conflict requires 
Antagonist and Protagonist. Since Professor Twining apparently has 
no Real Enemies to add spice to his intellectual romance, perhaps we 
had best provide him with some imaginary foes - a phantom school 
of thought against which The Rationalist Tradition can compete for 
hegemony. 
* * * 
A Manifesto of Legal Irrealist Disbelief 
We do not believe in a hierarchical kingdom of human faculties 
ruled by a mathematico-verbal monarch. We think that it is possible 
to know that for which there is as yet no word and to communicate 
that which cannot be described. It is our Faith that the fastest tongue 
in the West is no more entitled to rule than the fastest gun. 
We are irrational. We believe that there is a multitude of rationali-
ties; the choice of what is to be taken as "reasonable" is as much a 
political decision as the choice of what is "desirable." We reject those 
Ratzingers of Rationality who assert that an intellectual orthodoxy 
can be overthrown only by means that it is prepared to recognize as 
legitimate. We do not intend to let anyone dictate to us the terms on 
which our beliefs are to be justified, whether the dictator is armed with 
an English accent or an Israeli sub-machine gun. (Tenure? Let's 
talk .... ) 
We say "beliefs" because we do not think that there has ever been 
an intellectual system that did not begin (and often end) in something 
as simple and irrational as an Act of Faith. (An auto-da-fi, as they 
used to say.) A good example is Bentham, whose whole life's work 
rested on the faith that utilitarian arguments were capable of persuad-
ing those with most to lose from utilitarianism to accept it. If we must 
have faith to act, then we see no good reason not to put our faith in the 
multiple mentality of the many rather than in the singular talents of 
some specialist in Pure Thought. 
We are not opposed to logic any more than we are opposed to art. 
We would like to be able to know the limits and strengths of each. But 
we suspect that like runners and weightlifters, intellectual athletes are 
inclined to exaggerate their exercise of the mental muscle. Bentham, 
for example, did not oppose slavery on utilitarian grounds, and his 
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preference for democracy was based upon an undernourished logic. 
We doubt that many adherents of The Rationalist Tradition would 
reject Hitler's slaughter of Jews, Slavs, and Gypsies on the ground that 
genocide was not a rational response to the problem of pluralism. If 
feelings are an appropriate response to atrocities like these, we see no 
reason why, with proper exercise, sentiment might prove an able ally 
of reason in areas where it has previously been little more than a slave. 
One of the major tasks of any system of thought is to discover 
those procedures by which it can coexist with other subjectivities. In 
its interior manifestation, this is a problem of psychology; on the exte-
rior this is one of the meanings of "government." As Irrealists, we 
believe that peaceful if necessarily stressful coexistence is preferable to 
imperial strategies of conquest or subordination. Devising procedures 
by which this can be done is more an art than a science. Art is more 
tolerant of paradox, it teaches us to expect the unexpected, and it is 
more reverent toward the mysteries of existence than that "cow on 
stilts" - science. It is through art that we may come to sense that a 
condition of our own uniqueness is the singularity of other subjectivi-
ties, that pluralism is more promise than problem, and that somewhere 
in our souls there is sufficient similarity to permit us to survive each 
other without conquest or cloning. We accept objectivity; but we 
glory in subjectivity. 
But to get down to cases. If, as we believe, government is an art 
rather than a science, then litigation is a kind of political theatre. A 
trial is the present re-presenting the past (or sometimes pre-scenting 
the future) through the use of human speech and posture and the ma-
nipulation of places and things. To make it faithful to the past re-
quires a close attention to the presentness of the production; to be real, 
steps must be taken to make it unreal. The light that is cast across the 
stage is not the light of the sun that shone, and persons that move 
upon it are both more and less than they are (and were) in real life. If 
characters try to play themselves without close attention to the theat-
rical demands of the court, they quickly become cardboard. 
This theatre is, we must emphasize, political; it both presents and 
re-presents power relationships. It is the allocation of power on stage, 
and to some extent off it as well, that is the task of procedure; rules of 
evidence more resemble job descriptions than they do yardsticks for 
measuring Truth. Is the judge to be merely the stage manager or is he 
also the playwright? How much freedom do the characters have to 
improvise, to tell their own stories, and how constricted are they by 
the scripts that the law provides? The sorts of scripts the actors can 
play limits the power of the jurors when they gather to write what it is 
hoped will be the last ·act before " . . . and They lived happily 
Everafter." 
Our theatrical vision of litigation grants Logic a role in the trial, 
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but only a walk-on. It is important to recognize that the "science" on 
the forensic stage is only a pretense, the representation of the Real 
Thing. This has implications for the amount of information we will 
require or tolerate. We cannot do Nicholas Nicholby every night. But 
if we recognize the difference between a biology text and Moby Dick, 
we can question whether our forensic Melvilles really need to give us 
all they know about whales. The problem with our present system is 
that whether the party can emulate the massiveness of Mahler or is to 
be restricted to the miniatures of Mozart is left to the judge for indi-
rect regulation limited only by a highly politicized notion of what is 
and is not a Big Case. We could go on milking this metaphor, but .... 
Once "science" has been put in its place, we can focus on fairness. 
The insistence of Progressive Proceduralists that factual accuracy is 
the fundamental concern of rules of evidence has done little more than 
confer on judges vast powers that have been used to deny some parties 
the right to tell their own stories. Inductive logic and the hegemony of 
substance over procedure are tools by which the government portrays 
its political opponents as criminals. For example, in a recent sanctu-
ary trial the judge refused to allow the defendants to show the illegal-
ity of the government's proxy war in Central America and the political 
use of the powers of the I.N.S. that had led them to resort to civil 
disobedience; then, in sentencing them, the judge castigated the de-
fendants for their failure to trust the government. 
Such unfairness is not limited to political trials. Our rules gov-
erning character evidence give the prosecution a rather free hand to 
bring the defendant's misdeeds before the jury but prohibit the defense 
from showing specific instances of admirable conduct. There is a new 
privilege for the trysting spots of police spies, but none for lovers. The 
location of a vehicle identification number is likely to be excluded 
from evidence, but a mother's conversation with her child won't be. 
Computerized business records are not barred by the hearsay rule, but 
the family checkbook is. In Dalkon Shield litigation, some judges 
thought rationality required them to permit the corporate defendant to 
spread the victim's sex life before the jury, while not letting them hear 
of the corporation's contempt for human life or its efforts to cover up 
its crimes. This listing could be greatly extended, but this should suf-
fice to show why we do not join Professor Twining in applauding the 
sterile debates on probability that fill the pages of our law reviews, 
though we would have to concede that he is probably correct to think 
that they represent a Renaissance, if not the Apotheosis, of the Ration-
alist Tradition. 
Viewing litigation as political theatre should broaden the field of 
procedural inquiry to include other types of political drama - or 
dance. If we understand that a trial is no more rational than a Presi-
dential election, scholars as well as lawyers can learn from the uses to 
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which evidence, science, and art are put by those who stage our electo-
ral extravaganzas. If the goal of rules of evidence should be the equali-
zation of the political power of the participants, then Robert's Rules of 
Order is a more promising text than an elementary treatise on 
probability theory. Perhaps most important to the Legal Irrealist, this 
requires a turn away from the stiffing uniformity of Psuedo-science 
toward the diversity, the complexity, the contingency, and the crazi-
ness of contemporary culture. We disbelieve that the dull could ever 
be Divine. 
* * * 
"Things are mending now, I see a rainbow blending now . . .. " 
- Taking a Chance on Love 
* * * 
If the Reader has not long ago thrown up her hands in disgust and 
gone on to more profitable activities, she is undoubtedly waiting for 
the obligatory "good news." There is none. Worse yet, she will have 
to read the book for herself and make of it what she will. I hope that 
in the pages allotted me by the editors I have demonstrated that my 
response to Twining could easily exceed his book in length and scope 
- a desirable but infrequent occurrence in my experience. I should 
add that in the wild, Twining flies more freely and gives more pleasure 
than when pinned to the board as a mere specimen. 
I hope, however, that in his future work Professor Twining will get 
off his Yellow Submarine and look with some care at the ocean of 
intellectual history that separates us. While my major concern is with 
the impact of his imperialist ideas on those political pubescents in this 
country who continue to believe in the cultural superiority of England, 
I do not look with equanimity upon the possibility that he may have 
encouraged those multinational masters of the McDonald's mentality 
who would replace delightfully disgusting English institutions with the 
franchised products of American intellectual imperialism. Royall's Re-
venge Reversed is not a tragicomedy that appeals to me. 
Welcome to California, Professor Twining. Vamoose! 
